NOTE
CUSTOMIZING LIABILITY RULES IN THE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM
I
INTRODUCTION

Many criticisms are leveled against the current medical malpractice liability
system. One school of thought for improving the system, well represented in
this symposium, would encourage providers and customers to enter into
contracts that reform malpractice liability rules. Among the many
possibilities, such contracts might require arbitration of malpractice disputes,
change the standard of care used to determine provider negligence, limit
malpractice awards to victims' economic losses, or implement a "no-fault"
compensation scheme. This note focuses on how an initiative might be
developed specifically to permit private reforms of malpractice liability rules
within the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP).1 Such an
initiative by the federal government might favorably affect the cost of the
FEHBP while at the same time encourage progress down a promising avenue
toward reform of the tort system.
Under the FEHBP, the federal government maintains a "menu" of private
health benefits plans in which federal employees may choose to enroll. 2
These health benefits plans provide various combinations of health insurance
and services 3 and are operated by carriers in accordance with contracts with
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), 4 the agency entrusted with
Copyright © 1986 by Law and Contemporary Problems
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8913 (1982).
2. Actually, a federal retiree (annuitant) as well as a federal employee may participate in health
benefits plans, and both may participate either as individuals or for self and family. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 8905 (1982); see also 5 U.S.C. § 8901(1) (1982) (definition of "employee"); 5 U.S.C. § 8901(3)
(1982) (definition of "annuitant"); 5 U.S.C. § 8901(5) (1982) (definition of "member of family").
Federal employees participate in a health benefits plan by "enroll[ing]" in that plan. 5 U.S.C.
§ 8905(a) (1982). Annuitants "may continue [their] enrollment" in a health benefits plan. 5 U.S.C.
§ 8905(b) (1982).
During an "open season" held in November and December each year, federal employees may
enroll in health benefits plans, and federal employees and annuitants may change from one plan to
another or from self to self and family. See 5 C.F.R. § 890.301(d) (1984) (authorized by 5 U.S.C.
§ 8913(b) (1982)). Federal employees may change plans under other circumstances as well. See 5

C.F.R. § 890.301 (1984) (authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 8913(b) (1982)).
3. See 5 U.S.C. § 8903 (1982). The types of carriers that participate in the FEHBP and the
nature of the plans that they offer are considered infra at notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
4. See 5 U.S.C. § 8902 (1982). These contracts extend for one year. As a result, each year the
OPM reviews the benefits and premiums of plans in the FEHBP and negotiates adjustments. U.S.
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approving plans and running the FEHBP. 5 Federal employees find it
worthwhile to participate in the program because the federal government
contributes a substantial predetermined amount toward any particular plan's
subscription charge. 6 Since the amount generally does not vary from plan to
plan, federal employees have an incentive to shop among plans with price
differences in mind and carriers offering plans have an incentive to compete in
order to attract federal employees. Because of the competitive atmosphere of
the FEHBP, the program has been cited as a potentially useful model for a
system of national health insurance based on consumer choice and
7
competition.
The competitive atmosphere of the FEHBP also makes the program a
potentially worthwhile arena in which to encourage private reform of
malpractice liability rules. From the consumer's standpoint, the current
liability system operates as a kind of mandatory insurance system that
provides only limited financial protection at a very high cost. Although it may
generate desirable incentives for providers to prevent negligent injuries, it
may also encourage the practice of costly defensive medicine. As a result,
some federal employees choosing among FEHBP plans might well be
interested in choosing a plan featuring different liability rules. Conversely,
some carriers might be interested in catering to the preferences of such
federal employees and in using the latter's concessions on the liability front to
attract providers' participation in the plan on favorable terms.
Customization of liability rules within the FEHBP might be facilitated
either by federal legislation or by OPM regulations. The object of either
approach would be explicitly to authorize a carrier to offer a health benefits
plan in which a provider's potential liability to an enrolled subscriber in the
event of a treatment-induced injury differs in some way from that prescribed
by tort doctrine. The OPM, which must approve all FEHBP plans, 8 could
require such a customized-liability plan to meet certain safeguards designed
to protect enrollees.
Interest in having the federal government lend a hand in improving the
malpractice liability system already has been demonstrated in the MooreOFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, 1985 ENROLLMENT INFORMATION GUIDE AND PLAN COMPARISON

CHART 2 (1984). A federal employee or annuitant participating in a plan need not re-enroll each
year, however; once he is participating in a plan, he remains in that plan until he switches to a
different plan or drops out of the FEHBP. Id.

5. See 5 U.S.C. § 8913(a) (1982) ("The Office of Personnel Management may prescribe
regulations necessary to carry out this chapter.").
6. The contribution for any participating federal employee or annuitant is equal to 60% of the
average of the premiums of the six largest health benefits plans, so long as that figure does not
exceed 75% of the premiums for any particular plan. 5 U.S.C. § 8906 (1982). Employees and
annuitants, however, must bear the full cost of deductibles, copayments, office visits, examinations,
laboratory tests, and other similar expenses. FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM, 1985
ENROLLMENT INFORMATION GUIDE AND PLAN COMPARISON, at Chart 3 (pamphlet).
7. A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN:
MEDICAL CARE 82-84 (1980).
8.

See supra note 5.

THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING COST OF
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Gephardt bill,9 which is currently before Congress.

Instead of facilitating

private reform, however, this bill would impose a specific reform of liability
rules.' 0 Nevertheless, there are several reasons why the private-reform
approach is superior.Il First, because there is considerable uncertainty as to
the effect and desirability of any particular reform, encouraging private
initiatives would allow expression of differing preferences and would provide
valuable information to guide future reforms. Second, although any change

in liability rules is bound to place some consumers in a less advantageous
position, most consumers would find an increased risk that was attributable to
their personal choice more acceptable than a risk created by government
action. Third, with a mandatory rule change, there is no incentive for
providers to pass on savings attributable to the change; in contrast, if reform
is left to private choice, providers might offer concessions to consumers to
induce their agreement to a particular measure.' 2 Finally, and most
important, any federal action embracing a specific modification of tort law
would simply confirm the prevailing impression that government is the only
legitimate source of malpractice reform.' 3 By the same token, federal action
specifically endorsing private reform would be a clear invitation to the private
sector to experiment.
Although conceptually superior to the Moore-Gephardt bill, the FEHBP
initiative recommended in this note raises several major issues. One issue is
whether any legislative or other change in the FEHBP is needed in order to
permit carriers to offer customized-liability plans. A related issue is whether,
9. H.R. 5400, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)(introduced by Senators Moore and Gephardt).
Senator Durenberger has introduced the same bill to the Senate. S. 2690, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984). These bills are an adaptation of ideas presented by Professor Jeffrey O'Connell. See
O'Connell, Offers that Can't be Refused: Foreclosure of PersonalInjury Claims by Defendants'PromptTender of
Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 589 (1982). The Moore-Gephardt bill was slightly
modified and reintroduced in the first session of the 99th Congress as H.R. 3084, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985).
10. In the case of a malpractice claim arising from the provision of health care pursuant to any
federal program, defendants named in the claim could foreclose that claim by tendering (within six
months of the date of the injury involved) the plaintiffs net economic loss plus attorney's fees. H.R.
3084, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
11. One reason the private reform approach is superior that is not discussed in the text, is that
federal action permitting private reform probably would be less vulnerable to constitutional attack
than federal action that imposes a specific reform. State statutes altering aspects of the malpractice
liability system have been attacked, sometimes successfully, by individuals arguing that the statutes
violated federal and state constitutional provisions. See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R. 3D 583 (1977). In
contrast, Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), indicates that legislation that merely permits
private reform of liability rules is not state action upon which a constitutional violation may be based.
See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J.

YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 497-502 (2d ed. 1983) (state

action is a necessary element of nearly all constitutional violations). In Flagg, the Supreme Court
held that a state statute could permit a warehouseman to enforce his lien on goods by selling the
goods, even if the state itself could not constitutionally sell the goods: "This Court . . . has never
held that a State's mere acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that of the State."
436 U.S. at 164-67.
12. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
13. Such a result is not unlikely since the federal government traditionally has inhibited all types
of health care reform by maintaining a continued presence in the health care sector as regulator,
major purchaser, and indecisive architect.
INDUSTRY 387 (1982).

See C. HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE
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assuming that some enabling action is needed, new OPM regulations would
be as effective in facilitating change as federal legislation. Both of these issues
are discussed in section II. Section III considers what safeguards would be
appropriate to protect federal employees who are offered the option of
enrolling in customized-liability plans. Section IV then outlines certain
practical problems that might impede private reform of liability rules within
the FEHBP, assuming that such reform is permitted. Finally, section V
examines how a consumer choice approach to malpractice reform might be
extended to other federal health programs including Medicare, 14 the Civilian
Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), 15 and
16
the Health Maintenance Organization Act.
II
THE NEED TO CHANGE THE

FEHBP

Neither the FEHBP statute nor the OPM's implementing regulations
expressly permits or prohibits health benefits plans from altering malpractice
liability rules. 1 7 As a result, one may question whether an initiative in the
form of legislation or new regulations is needed to permit such reform.
Could not the OPM permit private reform simply by approving customizedliability plans? One reason why legislation or new regulations might be
needed is to ensure that provisions altering liability rules are enforceable.
Part A below considers the enforceability of such provisions under current
law. Part B considers whether, if desirable private reforms are currently
unenforceable, OPM regulations would be as effective as federal legislation in
curing this defect.
Regardless of the enforceability of private reforms and the technical force
of OPM regulations, however, the best argument for legislation may be the
need for Congress to signal its desire to foster privately initiated change.
Without such a signal, not much in the way of private reform is likely to
happen in the near future.' 8
A.

Enforceability of Private Reforms in the Absence of a Federal Initiative

1. State Law. Within the context of state law, the enforceability of only
certain types of private reforms has been addressed. These include
arbitration clauses, exculpatory clauses that purport to relieve providers of
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13 95-13 9 5zz (1982 & Supp. I 1983).
15. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1093 (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1982).
17. The FEHBP statute empowers the OPM to prescribe "reasonable minimum standards" for
carriers and health benefits plans. See 5 U.S.C. § 8902(e) (1982). Nowhere in the OPM's
implementing regulations are there specific prohibitions against plans containing clauses altering
malpractice liability rules. Such restrictions could be imposed by the OPM, however, since the
agency has reserved considerable general discretion for itself over the content of the health benefits

plans. See 5 C.F.R. § 890.203 (1985).
18. See C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 13, at 387.
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virtually all liability, absolute dollar limits on liability, and short time limits for
making claims.
Agreements between providers and consumers to arbitrate malpractice
claims have usually been enforced.' 9 Exceptions have arisen when
circumstances indicated that an arbitration agreement was an adhesion
contract in which a provider took advantage of his superior position or
bargaining strength. Thus, plaintiffs have been allowed to avoid arbitration
when the provision was inconspicuous, 20 was not clearly worded, 2' or did not
bind both parties equally. 2 2 Although courts have generally enforced
malpractice arbitration clauses, a leading case upholding such a clause,
Madden v. Kaiser FoundationHospitals,23 suggests that other reforms may not be
equally well received. 24 In rejecting an argument that a contract containing
an arbitration provision was an unfair adhesion contract, the California
Supreme Court expressly relied upon the fact that an arbitration clause
changes only the forum for dispute resolution and does not force a consumer
25
to waive any "substantive right."
In contrast to the general acceptance of agreements to arbitrate
malpractice claims, state courts have uniformly held invalid clauses that
attempted to relieve a provider of all liability for malpractice. 26 These cases
reflect two concerns with such provisions. The first concern is that such
contracts are adhesive and not fairly bargained. Thus, one court emphasized
that the exculpatory clause was inconspicuous, 2 7 while other courts have
stressed that the consumer was presented with the contract just before he was
to receive services and that his signature was a prerequisite to receiving
services .28
19. See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882
(1976); Doyle v. Giulicucci, 62 Cal. 2d 606, 401 P.2d 1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1965); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 1295 (West 1982); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 600.5041-5042 (Supp. 1985). But see O'Keefe v.
South Shore Internal Medicine Assoc., 102 Misc. 2d 59, 422 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1979) (court would wait
for legislature to address enforceabiltiy of malpractice arbitration clauses). The state statutes cited
above that authorize agreements to arbitrate malpractice claims, however, may impose notice
requirements more stringent than those in the FEHBP. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.

In one case, an FEHBP health benefits plan with an arbitration provision, see infra note 55 and
accompanying text, was subject to such a state statute; the plan's arbitration provision was upheld,
however, since it comported with the state statute. See Dinong v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d
845, 162 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1980). The case was decided before the FEHBP preemption statute was
passed. See generally infra note 32 and accompanying text.
20. See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976).
21. See id.
22. See Beynon v. Garden Grove Medical Group, 100 Cal. App. 3d 698, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146
(1980).
23. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976).
24. Id. at 712, 552 P.2d at 1186, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
25. Id.

26. See Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963); Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981); Smith v. Hospital Auth.,
160 Ga. App. 387, 287 S.E.2d 99 (1981); Meiman v. Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78 (Ky.
1969); Olson v.Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977).
27.

See Smith v. Hospital Auth., 160 Ga. App. 387, 389, 287 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1981).

28. See Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 98-101, 383 P.2d 441, 444-47, 32
Cal. Rptr. 33, 36-39 (1963); Smith v. Hospital Auth., 160 Ga. App. 387, 390, 287 S.E.2d 99, 102
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The second objection to exculpatory clauses is that they are against public
policy because providers are subject to state regulation and hold themselves
out as experts. 29 This same concern led another court to hold invalid an
agreement that limited a physician's liability to $15,000 and required a
malpractice victim to present his claim within thirty days of the medical
service. 30 The rationale behind the public policy argument appears to be that
providers, because of their superior knowledge as experts, should be subject
to the incentives to avoid adverse outcomes that are implicit in the liability
3
system. 1
Private reforms of malpractice liability rules need not take the form of
complete exoneration of providers, and it seems quite possible that they
might be designed and negotiated in ways that directly alleviate the concerns
present in the exculpatory clause cases. Nevertheless, it remains true that
none of the state law cases considered in this section directly supports the
enforceability of private agreements that alter malpractice liability rules in
ways other than by requiring arbitration of malpractice claims.
2. FederalPreemption. Despite doubts about the enforceability of contractual
reforms under state law, one might inquire whether a customized-liability plan
adopted by the OPM under the FEHBP would have the force of federal law
and thus preempt inconsistent state law. One argument for preemption
would be based on the following provision contained in the FEHBP statute:
The provisions of any contract [between the OPM and a carrier] under this chapter
which relate to the nature or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with
respect to benefits) shall supersede and preempt any State or local law, or any
regulation issued thereunder, which relates to health insurance or plans to the
extent
32
that such law or regulation is inconsistent with such contractual provisions.

The obvious question is whether a plan provision affecting tort liability
"relate[s] to the nature or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments
with respect to benefits)" under the plan. A provision in a plan altering
liability rules arguably satisfies this condition if federal employees enrolled in
the plan received a price break or broader services in exchange for agreeing
to the provision. The legislative history of the preemption statute, however,
(1981); Meiman v. Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78, 79-80 (Ky. 1969); Olson v. Molzen,
558 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tenn. 1977).
29. See Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 102, 383 P.2d 441, 447, 32 Cal. Rptr.
33, 38 (1963); Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391, 394, 282 S.E.2d 903, 905 (1981); Smith v.
Hospital Auth., 160 Ga. App. 387, 390, 287 S.E.2d 99, 102 (1981); Meiman v. Rehabilitation Center,
Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Ky. 1969); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tenn. 1977).
30. See Tatham v. Hoke, 469 F. Supp. 914 (W.D.N.C. 1979) (applying North Carolina law), aff'd
mem. sub. non. Hoke v. Cappel, 622 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1980).
31.

Cf Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and

Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978) (Statement of Clark C. Havighurst, Professor of Law,
Duke University) ("Almost certainly the reluctance of legislatures to make substantial changes in the
law of medical malpractice has been attributable to a sense that patients should not be deprived of
[the] basic right to seek redress for the serious harms that providers do, sometimes through culpable
neglect.").
32. 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) (1982).
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militates against such a broad interpretation. 3 3 The preemption statute was
enacted specifically in response to state statutes and regulations that require
health insurers to provide certain types and amounts of coverage and benefits
regardless of the insurer's contract with the OPM. 34 Provisions affecting
liability rules between providers and federal employees would have no
comparable direct effect on the types and amounts of coverage or benefits
offered by a carrier.
Another argument for preemption is that federal law should be used to
determine the enforceability of an FEHBP plan's liability provision in order to
promote the federal government's interest in uniform benefits for its
employees. A Tenth Circuit case, Howard v. Group Hospital Service,3 5 suggests,
however, that this argument would fail. In Howard, a federal employee who
had enrolled in a Blue Cross-Blue Shield plan brought suit against the carrier
for refusing to pay for services received on the ground that they were not
medically necessary, a condition for payment specified in the plan. The court,
confronted with the issue whether the case presented a federal question,
addressed the issue of federal preemption. Since the medical necessity
provision of the plan did not conflict with applicable state law, the FEHBP
preemption statute did not apply. 3 6 The defendant nevertheless argued that,
because the government was a party to the contract creating the plan, federal
law should be used to interpret the provision at issue in order to promote
uniformity of decisions. 37 The Tenth Circuit held that the federal
government's interest in the controversy was not substantial and thus that a
uniform rule was not necessary. 38 The court observed that the federal
treasury would not be directly affected by the outcome of the case, that only
private litigants were involved, and that the Blue Cross-Blue Shield plan
would not be significantly hindered in its operation even though varying state
law interpretations of "medical necessity" would affect which claims the
39
carrier had to pay.

Litigation over a customized-liability plan would present a similar
situation. The government would not suffer any direct financial loss. The
dispute would be between private litigants. Finally, it is unlikely that the
carrier offering such a plan would be significantly hindered if the provision
were subject to varying state interpretations. Malpractice liability of providers
has no direct effect on a carrier's ability to underwrite services or to reimburse
for normal health care costs.
33. See S. REP. No. 903, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1413; H.R. REP. No. 282, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977).
34. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47B (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1977); CAL. INS. CODE,
§ 10176 (West 1972); N.Y. INS. LAw § 3221 (McKinney 1985).
35. 739 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1984).
36. Id. at 1510 n.l.
37. Id. at 1509.
38. Id. (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)).
39. Howard v. Group Hosp. Serv. 739 F.2d at 1509-10.
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Even if a customized-liability provision in an FEHBP plan preempted
inconsistent state law, which is unlikely, the provision is not necessarily
enforceable. In the absence of a specific statutory directive, or an
interpretation of a statute by an agency entrusted with its execution,
preemption raises the question of how federal common law applies to the
issue. 40 There do not appear to be any federal common law cases on the
enforceability of customized-liability provisions relating to medical
malpractice. Nevertheless, the prospects of enforceability are probably just as
doubtful under federal common law, which usually looks to state law for rules
4
of decision. '
B.

Preemption by Federal Legislation or OPM Regulation

Congress, of course, could override any state law that prevents FEHBP
plans from effectively varying malpractice liability rules. 42 Whether the OPM
could accomplish this same feat through its power to issue regulations
implementing the FEHBP is not as clear. Two related but distinguishable
issues are involved. The first is whether the OPM has statutory authority to
approve contracts with customized-liability provisions and to declare them
legally enforceable. The second issue is whether such action by the OPM
would override state law objections to such provisions.
Acceptance of private reforms and declaration of their enforceability do
not appear to be outside of the OPM's statutory authority. In general, a
construction of a statutory mandate by an agency entrusted with carrying it
out is deferred to so long as the construction is reasonable. 43 The OPM has
40. See American Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 710 F.2d 1528, 1534 n.7 (1lth Cir. 1983) ("Though it is
settled beyond question that Federal law governs cases involving the rights of the FDIC, . . . courts
must look to federal common law where, as in the present case, federal statutory law does not
provide a rule of decision."); Woodfork v. Marino Cooks & Stewards Union, 642 F.2d 966, 972-73
(5th Cir. 1981) (the fact that Employment Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) preempts
state law regarding employee pension plans does not limit plaintiff-employees' remedies to the
substantive provisions of the statute; as a result, federal common law would be applied); Murphy v.
Heppenstall Co., 635 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982) (although
ERISA supersedes state law relating to employee pension plans, plaintiff-employees were not
precluded from pursuing claims based on federal common law of labor-management relations and
pension plans); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 1193, 1198 (E.D. Cal. 1978)
(when an issue is governed by federal law but not addressed by the federal constitution or a federal
statute, federal common law applies); cf Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 45657 (1957) (collective bargaining agreements are subject to federal law, not state law; this federal law
must be fashioned by the federal courts).
41. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (in fashioning federal
common law to govern collective bargaining agreements, state law would be looked to for guidance);
American Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 710 F.2d 1528, 1534 n.7 (1lth Cir. 1983) (although only federal law
applies to cases involving the rights of the FDIC, the court would look to Florida law to provide the
rules of decision for analyzing an escrow agreement that the parties assumed would be controlled by
Florida law); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 1193, 1198 (E.D. Cal. 1978) (a
federal common law rule of decision can derive from state law).
42. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 11, at 292-93. To absolutely
assure preemption, Congress could specifically provide that its legislation preempted state law.
43. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984).
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authority to enter into contracts with carriers 4 4 and general authority to carry
out the FEHBP. 4 5 It would seem entirely reasonable for it to declare that
providers and federal employees are bound by plan provisions affecting tort
rights despite inconsistent state law or policy. As discussed further below, the
OPM might specify certain conditions that must be satisfied before federal
policy would require enforcement of the contract's terms; such conditions
might be aimed at satisfying concerns similar to those that might prompt state
courts to deny enforcement.
Whether issuance of such a regulation would preempt inconsistent state
law is not perfectly clear. Nevertheless, if the OPM has statutory authority to
declare federal policy, then that policy would seem to be binding on the
states. The true issue, therefore, remains whether Congress meant to allow
state prerogatives to be overridden. With respect to this issue federalism
concerns might point to a narrow construction of agency authority. In
American OptometricAssociation v. FTC,46 a federal court of appeals observed that
an FTC regulation, which it remanded for reconsideration on other grounds,
may have exceeded the agency's authority because it purported to override
direct regulation of opthalmic advertising by the states. 47 It was possible to
view the FTC rule in question, however, as an effort by a federal agency to use
a very general antitrust statute as a vehicle for overriding specific state
legislative policy in a field of business regulation. Such economic regulation
has long been regarded as a province in which state legislatures are granted
especially wide discretion. 48 The direct federal interest in an OPM regulation
establishing the validity of customized-liability provisions in FEHBP plans
would seem to strengthen the preemption argument. Similarly, unless a state
has legislated expressly on the point, 4 9 the challenge to state prerogatives
would seem slight if the only power overridden was that of state judges to
rewrite private contracts.
Although it is unclear whether an OPM regulation authorizing private
reforms would effectively preempt inconsistent state law, there appears to be
another route by which the OPM could ensure preemption. Relying on the
rule that defers to administrative interpretations of statutes, the agency could
issue a regulation interpreting the FEHBP preemption statute 50 to apply to
customized-liability provisions in health benefits plans. Thus, the OPM
regulations could be nearly as effective in authorizing private tort reform as
new federal legislation.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See 5 U.S.C. § 8902 (1982).
See 5 U.S.C. § 8913(a) (1982).
626 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 910.
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
See Dinong v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 845, 162 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1980).
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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III
SAFEGUARDS FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

The proposal to allow federal employees to enroll in customized-liability
plans contemplates that the OPM would act to protect federal employees from
overreaching by carriers and providers who participate in FEHBP plans. The

FEHBP statute requires the OPM, in its role as middleman, to provide two
types of protection for federal employees selecting from the menu of plans
offered. First, the OPM must provide employees with sufficient information
to enable them to exercise an "informed choice." 5 1 Second, the OPM has
authority to prescribe "reasonable minimum standards" for both carriers and
the plans they offer. 5 2 These statutory provisions raise two questions: how
federal employees should be informed of customized-liability provisions, and
whether the OPM should preclude plans from modifying liability rules in
certain ways.
A.

Disclosure

In deciding how the content of plans with customized-liability provisions
should be disclosed, one might consider precedents in the area of malpractice
arbitration clauses. One precedent is found within the FEHBP itself. The
Kaiser Foundation health benefits plan serving northern California contains
an arbitration clause governing medical malpractice claims. 53 Apparently, the
OPM has interpreted its duty to enable federal employees to exercise an
informed choice as requiring only that a description of the clause be included
in the plan's brochure. 54 A federal employee enrolling in the plan may easily
fail to appreciate that he is waiving his right to a jury trial. In addition,
because federal employees remain enrolled in a plan until they change plans
or drop out of the FEHBP altogether and because the OPM renegotiates its
contracts with carriers yearly, an employee may become subject to a provision
that was not part of the plan when he originally enrolled. 55 No special
provision is made for ensuring that individuals know specifically of any
changes in their legal rights.
A more rigorous approach to disclosure of arbitration requirements is
found in a California statute that insulates certain arbitration clauses in
medical service contracts against attack on the ground that the clauses are
adhesive, unconscionable, or otherwise improper. 56 In order to be so
insulated, a contract must contain notice, in prominent locations and in
51.
52.

5 U.S.C. § 8907(a) (1982).
5 U.S.C. § 8902(e) (1982).

53.

See

(1985).
54.

55.

U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

MANAGEMENT,

KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH

PLAN,

INC.

5

Id.
In Dinong v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 845, 162 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1980), a federal

employee was held to be bound by the arbitration clause that became part of his FEHBP plan after he
enrolled, despite the fact that he was unaware of the clause.
56. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982). See also Michigan Malpractice Arbitration Act,
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5041-.5042 (Supp. 1985), which creates a presumption as to the
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statutory language, of the arbitration clause. 5 7 One California decision
treated these state requirements as binding on a FEHBP plan. 58 The OPM

has not, however, taken the initiative to remove arbitration clauses from such
state oversight. The focus here is not on the preemption issue, however, but
on the disclosure requirement that the OPM might adopt.
In Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,59 the court upheld an arbitration
clause which was adopted after the plaintiff had enrolled in the plan and of
which he claimed to have been unaware. The plaintiff was a state employee
whose benefits were provided under a scheme similar to the FEHBP, and the
state was held to have acted as the plaintiff's agent in negotiating the
arbitration clause. 60 Under agency theory, disclosure to the agent alone
would seem sufficient to entitle the plan to enforce the contract against the
agent's principal, even if the latter was never informed of the deal negotiated
on his behalf. But this interpretation clearly is inconsistent with the goal of
ensuring informed choice by government employees. Thus, the OPM should
focus not only on ensuring the contract's enforceability, but also on full
disclosure to those on whose behalf it negotiates. For purposes of legal
analysis, however, it may be appropriate to think of the disclosure obligation
as falling on the OPM, as the agent negotiating the contract on behalf of
federal employees, and not on the health benefits plan itself. Under this
interpretation, once the contract is made, its enforceability cannot be called
into question.
While the OPM's approach of providing only for simple disclosure in the
plan's brochure may be an acceptable way to inform federal employees about
arbitration clauses in FEHBP plans, California's more particularized
disclosure requirement appears preferable for plans that go beyond forum
selection to change substantive tort rights. As suggested by Justice Tobriner
in the Madden case, contractual reforms of the liability system that do more
than just change the forum impose greater restrictions on consumers'
traditional rights than do arbitration clauses. 6' In addition, while arbitration
is considered to be a "proper and usual" means of resolving medical
malpractice disputes, 62 clauses making substantive changes, though not
necessarily improper, are certainly unusual. 6 3 Using the California statute as
a guide, the OPM might require employees enrolling in a plan with
validity of certain malpractice arbitration provisions. This presumption is apparently rebuttable. See
Capman v. Harper-Grace Hosp., 96 Mich. App. 510, 294 N.W.2d 205 (1980).
57. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(e) (West 1982). An exception is created for consumers'
contracts with providers of health care on a prepaid basis, generally known as HMO's. See CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1295(e) (West 1982). Michigan has similar notice requirements for the contract, but
does not create exceptions and also requires that a brochure be supplied to consumers who might
become subject to a malpractice arbitration clause. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5041(6),
600.5042(7) (Supp. 1985).
58. Dinong v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 845, 162 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1980).
59. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976).
60. Id. at 705, 552 P.2d at 1181, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
61. Id. at 712, 552 P.2d at 1186, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
62. Id. at 706, 552 P.2d at 1182, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
63. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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customized-liability provisions to sign a document that describes the plan's
reforms in language approved by the agency. It would seem especially
desirable that employees should not become subject to alterations in their tort
64
rights after they enroll in a plan unless they sign a similar document.
B.

Screening Customized-Liability Provisions

It might be argued that the OPM should not screen customized-liability
provisions for fairness and should instead rely solely on disclosure to prevent
overreaching. Like all consumers, however, federal employees have limited
expertise in health care matters 6 5 and would benefit from the OPM's services
as a purchasing agent negotiating on their behalf and protecting them against
unwise choices of liability rules. The Madden court, in upholding the
arbitration clause in a plan offered under a state program similar to the
FEHBP, was specifically impressed by the fact that the agency running the
state program had screened plans and had "parity of bargaining strength"
with carriers. 6 6 The court's view of the agency's role suggests that the OPM
should approach its task not as a regulator seeking to define or dictate the
best possible set of liability rules, but as an agent of federal employees
charged with ensuring that the choices offered to them are ones that rational,
well-informed consumers might reasonably make. Although the agency might
choose to prohibit sweeping exculpatory clauses of the kind that courts have
found to be against public policy, 6 7 it might also permit such clauses if
disclosure was adequate, if it was satisfied that the employees had ample
supplementary financial protection, and if the employees were given a
substantial price break in return for waiving their legal rights.
Although OPM oversight is indicated, there are several reasons why the
agency should not be overly protective of federal employees. First, it is not at
all clear that the existing tort system provides optimal protection against the
financial risks of medical injury or is an ideal quality assurance mechanism.
Changes in the existing tort system would not necessarily be opposed to the
employees' interests. Second, the successful twenty-five year history of the
FEHBP suggests that federal employees are capable of protecting their own
interests as consumers when exercising choice as to medical matters. 68 Third,
64. Cf Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps. 17 Cal. 3d at 717-18, 552 P.2d at 1189-90, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 893-94 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (plaintiff should not be bound by malpractice arbitration
provision in a group medical plan in which he enrolled under a state program, similar to the FEHBP,
where provision was incorporated into plan after he enrolled).
65. The concern that a lack of expertise in health care matters places consumers at a
disadvantage with providers over malpractice liability rules has been expressed both by
commentators, see Danzon, An Economic Analysis of the Medical Malpractice System, 1 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 39,
41 (1983); Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1282, 1288
(1978), and by courts invalidating agreements to modify liability rules, see cases cited supra notes 2022 and 26-28.
66. Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps. 17 Cal. 3d at 711, 552 P.2d at 1185, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
67. See cases cited supra note 29.
68. See A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 7, at 83 ("I have heard many arguments against multiple choice
and economic competition in health insurance: 'Consumers aren't capable of making such
choices';. . .'They'll all take the cheapest plan, and quality will be sacrificed.' The experience of the
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federal employees are not particularly necessitous and, moreover, are
probably by nature (judging from the type of employment they have selected)
risk-averse individuals who would be wary of any liability-limiting provision
contained in a plan. Fourth, carriers are concerned with their image and
would be careful to avoid incorporating provisions that suggest that they offer
only "second-rate" coverage or inadequate deterrence against poor quality
69
medical care.
The most important reason for avoiding excessive agency interference,
however, is to increase the likelihood that private reform of liability rules will
be attempted. Excessive screening of customized-liability provisions would
inhibit private reform by increasing costs and uncertainty, by restricting the
types of reforms that could be proposed, 70 and by signaling to the private
sector that government continues to have the final word. 7 1 To further
improve the climate for private reform, the FEHBP initiative should expressly
insulate customized-liability provisions from attack in the courts once they
have survived the OPM screening and have been freely chosen by consumers
to whom the prescribed disclosure has been made.
IV
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS

Simply permitting private reform of malpractice liability rules within the
FEHBP will not guarantee that such reform will occur. The development of a
health benefits plan that alters the responsibilities of providers and the rights
of federal employees necessarily depends upon the creation of a three-way
contractual relationship between providers, a carrier, and federal employees.
The carrier offering the plan is the intermediary. The carrier must first get
providers to agree that an altered set of liability rules will govern their legal
relationship with federal employees who enroll in the plan. The carrier then
must convince federal employees that it is in their interest to enroll in a plan
governed by such rules.
This general scenario raises two questions. The first is what types of
carriers participating in the FEHBP can best develop contractual relationships
with providers. The second question is how a carrier can entice providers and
federal employees to participate in such a plan. In general, some practical
difficulties exist that raise questions about the likelihood that significant
private initiatives will be taken, even if the federal government invites them.
Nevertheless, even if deviations from established patterns are initially
FEHBP shows that these, and most of the other, arguments against such competition are not
supported by experience.").
69. Interview with Ron Rabbu, member of the OPM's Office of Insurance Programs, Program
Planning and Evaluation Division, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 21, 1984).
70. The agency might well impose many restrictions as a result of a risk-averse strategy or in the
pursuit of egalitarian goals. See C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 13, at 398-99, 401-04.
71. Cf id.at 387 (health care industry tends to await government's decisions as to what course
reform should take since government has a continued presence in the health care sector as a
"regulator, major purchaser, and indecisive architect").
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infrequent, a great deal might be learned from the occasional initiatives,
which others might then be stimulated to emulate. In addition, placing
responsibility on the private sector seems generally in keeping with other
72
recent developments in federal health policy.
A.

Developing Contractual Relationships Between Carriers and Providers

One group of FEHBP carriers are the traditional fee-for-service carriers.
These carriers offer plans that pay for provider services on the basis of "usual
and customary" fees or a fee schedule. The traditional fee-for-service carriers
participating in the FEHBP include: Blue Cross and Blue Shield, whose
Federal Employees Program runs the government-wide Service Benefit
Plan; 73 Aetna life & Casualty, which runs the government-wide Indemnity
Benefit Plan;7 4 and various employee organizations, which run plans tailored

to the needs of particular groups that are spread across the country or around
the world, such as foreign service personnel. 75 Of these traditional fee-forservice carriers, only Blue Cross and Blue Shield and a few employee
organizations rely significantly upon contracts with providers to obtain
services for plan subscribers. 76 The other traditional carriers, unless they
change their methods of operation, are in a poor position to develop plans
77
that alter malpractice liability rules.
Even though Blue Cross and Blue Shield and some employee
organizations currently maintain contracts with providers, modifying these
carriers' plans in order to change malpractice liability rules might appear to
be a hopeless task. Because these plans generally offer the same packages to
federal employees across the country, 78 it might appear that the carriers
would have to get all of their providers across the country to agree to a given
liability reform. A recent development in the FEHBP, however, demonstrates
that plans offered by traditional fee-for-service carriers do not have to be
changed on a nationwide scale. In the near future, an employee organization
plan that services federal employees across the country may offer its federal
employees in, for example, the Baltimore-Washington area the option of
72.

Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma: Market Opportunities and Legal Obstacles, LAW &

CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 143.

73. See 5 U.S.C. § 8903(1) (1982).
74. See 5 U.S.C. § 8903(2) (1982).
75. See 5 U.S.C. § 8903(3) (1982).
76. Interview with Ron Rabbu, supra note 69. Under the contracts, providers agree to accept
what the carrier pays for various services as payment in full.
77. The carriers, which do not rely on contracts with providers, only agree with subscribers to
pay certain amounts either to the subscribers or directly to the service providers. The subscriber is
responsible for any difference between the amount charged for the service and what the carrier has
agreed to pay. Interview with Kenneth Lease, member of the OPM's Office of Insurance Programs,
Program Planning and Evaluation Division, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 21, 1984).
78. Telephone interview with Ron Rabbu, member of the OPM's Office of Insurance Programs,
Program Planning and Evaluation Division (Jan. 7, 1985). The Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plan must
have two levels of benefits, 5 U.S.C. § 8903(1) (1982), and employee organization plans may have
two options, see 5 C.F.R. § 890.201(b)(3) (1984) (authorizing all plans to have two options).
Currently, however, the same options generally are offered nationwide. Telephone interview with
Ron Rabbu, supra.

Page 223: Spring 1986]

CUSTOMIZING LIABILITY RULES

seeking care through a so-called "preferred provider organization" (PPO). 79
Because a PPO is usually constituted through provider contracts and
functions on a local scale,8 0 it might be utilized by traditional fee-for-service
carriers to offer federal employees an alternative source of health care under a
different set of malpractice liability rules. Indeed, the prospect of some
malpractice relief might be powerful inducement for physicians and hospitals
to join a PPO and to grant a discount to consumers willing to give up some of
their tort rights.
Health maintenance organizations (HMO's) constitute a separate group of
FEHBP carriers, operating what are called "comprehensive medical plans."
In contrast to fee-for-service plans, which reimburse providers or patients for
each service rendered, these plans offer all needed medical services to federal
employees for a fixed, prepaid amount. 8 ' Health maintenance organizations
operate on a local scale and fall into three categories-"staff model" HMO's,
"group-practice prepayment plans, ' '8 2 and "individual-practice prepayment
plans."8 3 Staff model HMO's directly employ salaried physicians. In grouppractice HMO's, medical services are rendered by a physician group that
practices in a common center or centers and receives all or part of its
professional income from a prepaid fund. 84 Individual-practice HMO's
contract with individual physicians and physician groups to provide services in
return for compensation that can take various forms.8 5 Because all types of
HMO's are local in nature and are based on contractual relations, these
organizations might be able to develop customized rules governing
malpractice liability.
Telephone interview with Ron Rabbu, supra note 78.
Knowledge of some other facts about PPO's may be useful. See generally AM. MEDICAL ASS'N,
PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS 3-9 (1983). Although there is not a "typical" PPO, all PPO's
contract with providers to render services to a defined population of subscribers. Unlike HMO's,
PPO's reimburse these "preferred providers" on a fee-for-service basis, where the fees are agreed
upon in advance. The fees agreed upon often are at a discount of up to 15%-20% from usual
charges. The discount, in time, can be passed on to subscribers. In contrast with members of
HMO's, PPO subscribers may receive services from non-preferred physicians and do not have to
shoulder the entire cost of these services. Financial incentives generally are built into PPO's,
however, to encourage subscribers to use preferred providers.
81. See 5 U.S.C. § 8903(4) (1982). Exactly which organizations may offer comprehensive
medical plans should be clarified. As noted earlier, the term "health maintenance organization"
generally refers to an organization offering prepaid health plans. See supra note 57. The FEHBP
statute, however, appears to specify that comprehensive medical plans may only be run by
organizations that meet the requirements of a federal statute that controls which organizations
qualify as HMO's for the purpose of receiving federal assistance. See 5 U.S.C. § 8902(1) (1982)
(referring to 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9(d) (1982)). Nevertheless, the OPM contracts with any organization
that simply meets applicable state law requirements for HMO's. Telephone interview with Kenneth
Lease, member of the OPM's Office of Insurance Programs, Program Planning and Evaluation
Division (Jan. 7, 1985); Telephone interview with Ron Rabbu, supra note 78.
82. See 5 U.S.C. § 8903(4)(A) (1982).
83. See 5 U.S.C. § 8903(4)(B) (1982).
84. 5 U.S.C. § 8903(4)(A) (1982).
85. 5 U.S.C. § 8903(4)(B) (1982). The contracts provide that the physician will accept payment
provided by the plan as full payment for covered services. Id.
79.
80.
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Inducing Federal Employees and Providers to Participate in a
Customized-Liability Plan

A plan that enables providers to reduce their costs associated with
malpractice liability and explicitly to pass some of these savings on to
enrollees would appear to have the best chance of enticing both federal
employees and providers to participate. Nevertheless, a federal employee
might agree to a liability reform even without receiving an identifiable benefit
in return. For example, many federal employees have enrolled in the Kaiser
Foundation plan which requires an enrollee to arbitrate any malpractice claim
but which, apparently, offers no concession in exchange.8 6 In order to
interest federal employees in reforms that go beyond arbitration and alter
substantive liability rules, however, it may be essential to offer specific
inducements.

87

The two areas in which a customized-liability plan might produce savings
in provider costs are malpractice insurance costs and defensive medicine
costs. 8

8

It may be difficult for providers to realize savings in malpractice

insurance costs. Because federal employees are likely to constitute only a
small percentage of the practice of a given provider, a liability insurer may not
see fit to lower premiums to reflect any marginal savings produced by an
alteration of liability rules applicable to these patients alone. Under most
plan/provider contracts, the provider agrees to treat all patients covered by
the carrier, not just federal employees enrolled in the carrier's FEHBP plan.89
Except in a few staff-model and group-practice HMO's, providers are not
86. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
87. Interview with Kenneth Lease, supra note 77; Interview with John McCart, member of OPM's
Office of Insurance Programs, Comprehensive Plans Division, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 21, 1984);
Interview with Ron Rabbu, supra note 69.
88. Carriers probably would want to pass on savings in the form of reduced cost sharing or
expanded coverage rather than in the form of reductions in premiums, since the federal government
would share such reductions with federal employees. Interview with Ron Rabbu, supra note 69; see
supra note 6.
HMO's that desire to qualify for federal assistance would be precluded, however, from passing on
savings only to federal employees and not to other members enrolled in the organizations. An
HMO, in order to qualify for federal assistance, must offer all of its members the same package of
services at rates fixed under a "community rating system." See 42 U.S.C. § 300e(b)(l) (1982). Such a
system may classify members into groups and assign a different rate for each group, but such a
classification may only be "based on factors which the [HMO] determines predict the differences in
the use of health services by the [members] in each class." 42 U.S.C. § 300e-l(8)(C)(i) (1982). An
exception to the classification rule allows different rates for an HMO's members who enrolled
pursuant to a contract between a federal government authority and the HMO. But this exception is
specifically voided in the case of the FEHBP. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-l(8)(D) (1982).
Thus, it may be desirable to amend this federal HMO legislation in order to permit HMO's
receiving federal assistance to offer FEHBP health benefits plans that pass savings on to enrolling
federal employees who agree to a malpractice liability reform. The absence of such an amendment,
however, would not mean that HMO's participating in the FEHBP could not pass on such savings.
As noted earlier, the OPM does not require HMO's offering health benefits plans to be qualified for
federal assistance; simply meeting applicable state requirements is sufficient. See supra note 81. In
addition, many HMO's find that whether they qualify for federal assistance is inconsequential
because such assistance currently is meager.
89. Interview with Ron Rabbu, supra note 69.
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limited to treating plan subscribers but may treat other patients as well. 90
Significant difficulties would be encountered in estimating the reduced
liability exposure from a customized-liability provision affecting a variable
fraction of a provider's patients.
Another barrier to the realization of savings from modified malpractice
liability rules is the reluctance of malpractice insurers to vary the premiums of
individual physicians on the basis of their individual claims experience. 9 1 This
general insurance industry practice is not an absolute barrier, however.
Some providers' insurance rates are affected by their individual records, while
other providers, such as some hospitals and HMO's, self-insure to some
extent. 9 2 In addition, an FEHBP initiative of the kind considered in this note
could motivate insurers to reward providers who obtain voluntary relief from
93
malpractice suits.
Although a carrier might anticipate lower costs if customized-liability
provisions reduced pressures to practice defensive medicine, these savings
may be hard to realize. Because federal employees under special liability rules
would undoubtedly represent only a small part of the practice of most
providers, providers may find it impractical or undesirable to change their
practice style when treating these individuals. 94 Alternatively, if a plan should
induce a change in practice style, the benefits of that change may be shared by
other carriers covering patients of that provider. Some HMO's, however,
might be able to capture and pass on savings from the elimination of
defensive practice.
V
FACILITATING PRIVATE REFORM OF LIABILITY RULES IN OTHER

FEDERAL PROGRAMS

Federal health care financing programs other than the FEHBP could also
be modified to permit private reform of malpractice liability rules. One such
program is Medicare, 9 5 an entitlement program under which the federal
government pays participating providers for rendering medical services to the
aged and disabled. 9 6 Traditionally, Medicare's strong orientation toward
90. While physicians participating in some group-practice HMO's may not treat consumers who
are not members of the HMO, physicians participating in many other plans may treat consumers who
are not parties to those arrangements. See AMERICAN MEDICAL AssOCIATION, supra note 80, at 6.

91. Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 65, at 1287.
92. Telephone interview with Elton Stone, Risk Manager for Kaiser Foundation Corporation
(Dec. 5, 1984).
93.

Id.

94. If providers participating in HMO's or PPO's can realize savings in the costs of defensive
medicine, however, HMO's and PPO's appear to be in a good position to negotiate with these
providers to alter their style of practicing medicine. HMO's and PPO's generally have mechanisms in
place for reviewing the level of care rendered by their providers. See Fox & Weismann, Introduction to
ATIFORNEYS & PHYSICIANS EXAMINE PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS at vii J. Waxman ed. 1984).
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395zz (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (1982).

[Vol. 49: No. 2

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

reimbursing providers on a fee-for-service basis 9 7 inhibited participation by

HMO's in the program. Under 1982 legislation, however, the federal
government will now pay a set amount to an approved HMO on behalf of an
enrolled Medicare beneficiary. 9 8
The HMO amendment to Medicare creates an incentive for a Medicare
beneficiary to compare HMO's. The competitive arena thus created is a
potential site for encouraging HMO's-perhaps by explicit legislation-to
offer beneficiaries a chance to economize by agreeing to an alteration of
prevailing liability rules. Safeguards similar to those discussed in section III,
above, could be implemented to protect beneficiaries. Reform need not stop
here, however. The arena of competition could be enlarged by creating a
"voucher" system modeled after the FEHBP. 99 Such a voucher system would
expand upon the concept underlying the new HMO option by providing all
Medicare beneficiaries with a fixed public contribution that could be applied
toward the purchase of any approved private health care plan. The carriers of
these plans could in turn be allowed by the Health Care Financing
Administration to offer beneficiaries customized liability rules under
safeguards similar to those suggested above.
Another potential area for facilitating private reform of liability rules is the
CHAMPUS' 0 0 program, which enables certain military personnel and their
dependents to obtain health care from private providers.' 0 ' The statute
creating the program commands the Secretary of Defense to "contract . . .
for medical care for [beneficiaries of CHAMPUS] under such insurance,
medical service, or health plans as he considers appropriate."' 10 2 This vague
language has been used to create a program by which the federal government
acts as an insurance carrier for CHAMPUS beneficiaries.

0 3

Although most

CHAMPUS beneficiaries do not choose among competing private health
plans, a recent experiment has allowed beneficiaries in certain geographical
areas to enroll in HMO's with the benefit of a government subsidy designed
to encourage them to compare costs. 10 4

This experiment is limited in

scale, 10 5 but it may signal a movement toward a kind of voucher system and
the creation of a competitive arena in which private health plans can
experiment with modifications of liability rules.

97. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (Supp. 1 1983).
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). Actually, payments may only be made to an
"eligible organization," but this term is defined to encompass most HMO's. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395mm(b) (Supp. 1985).
99. See Ginsburg, Medical Vouchers and the Procompetitive Strategy, 1 HEALTH AFF. 39 (1971).
100. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1093 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
101. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1079, 1086 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
102. 10 U.S.C. § 1079(a) (Supp.11 1984); seealso 10 U.S.C. § 1086(a) (Supp. 11 1984) (referring to

§ 1079(a)).
103. Interview with Morris Jones of the Office of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) (Jan. 9, 1985). The "plan" that the federal government offers
CHAMPUS beneficiaries is modeled after a Blue Cross and Blue Shield plan. Id.
104. Id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 1092(a)(l)(F) (Supp. II 1984).
105. Telephone interview with Morris Jones, supra note 103.
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A final way for the federal government to encourage private reform would
be to amend the HMO Act. 10 6 In general, the HMO Act specifies
requirements that organizations must meet in order to qualify for certain
statutory benefits. Nothing in the Act specifically prohibits federally qualified
HMO's from entering into customized-liability agreements with their
enrollees. 0 7 Nevertheless, legislation amending the act to authorize such
provisions in HMO contracts would increase the likelihood of
experimentation with such agreements.
VIII
CONCLUSION

This note proposes that the FEHBP permit private carriers to offer federal
employees the opportunity to enroll in health benefits plans that modify the
arguably unsatisfactory tort rules governing medical malpractice. The OPM
would act on behalf of federal employees by ensuring full disclosure of the
changes in legal rights proposed and by screening out unconscionable
proposals. In addition to providing these safeguards, the OPM should
declare that plan reforms adopted under its auspices are not to be denied
enforcement by state or federal courts. Although congressional action is
probably not necessary to effectuate this proposal, legislation might be
desirable as a way of signalling the OPM, the private sector, and the courts
that this path to private reform is available and has the government's
approval.
The proposal offered here is a limited one that, at best, could affect only a
small portion of the population. Nevertheless, it offers an opportunity for
Congress, which has expressed interest in the problem, to take a constructive
step toward solving the malpractice impasse. By steering a middle course the
federal government does neither too little nor too much, and gives leadership
to the states while staying well within its legitimate province for federal action
on an issue that is primarily a state responsibility. Moreover, by adopting the
proposal the federal government would send a clear signal to private interests
concerning their opportunity and responsibility to develop reforms of
malpractice liability rules. Although the modest measure suggested here may
not respond adequately to the desire of some for Congress to do something
dramatic about the emerging malpractice crisis, it might serve to open up the
private sector as a new avenue to reform of liability rules.

106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1982).
107. Nevertheless, the "community rating system" requirement of the HMO Act would present
an obstacle to federally qualified HMO's that want to pass on savings realized through liability
limiting agreements. See supra note 88.

